e
following affirmation (p. 201):--

'This natural probability is converted into certainty when we take into
consideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the
Law of Causation, and which makes us _unable to conceive the beginning
of anything without_ an antecedent condition, _or cause.'_ Such
'inability to conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts.
First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until agreement
is obtained what the word _cause_ means. If three persons, A, B, and C,
agree in affirming it--A adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of
Sir William Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill--the agreement is purely
verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency pressing
for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satisfies it.

Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause, certainly those
who deny his theory can have no difficulty in conceiving events without
any cause (in that sense): nor have those who adopt this theory any
greater difficulty. These latter _believe_ that there are, throughout,
constant and uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event
depends; but they can perfectly _conceive_ events as occurring without
any such uniform sequence. In truth, the belief in such causation, as
pervading _all nature_, is an acquired result of scientific training.
The greater part of mankind believe that some events occur in regular,
others in irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the
metaphysical world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that
all volitions occur without any cause at all.]

[Footnote 14: Among the various authorities (upon this question of
quantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamilton in the valuable
Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' we find one (p. 311) which takes
the same ground of objection as Mr Mill, in these words:--'The cause why
the quantitative note is not usually joined with the predicate, is, that
there would thus be two _quaesita_ at once; to wit, whether the predicate
were affirmed of the subject, and whether it were denied of everything
beside. For when we say, _all man is all rational_, we judge that _all
man is rational_, and judge likewise _that rational is denied of
everything but man_. But these are, in reality, two different _quaesita_;
and therefore it has become usual to state them, not in one, but in two
several propositions. And this is self-evident, se