with Conceptualism, in the special sense of antithesis to
Realism and Nominalism,--but is, in fact, the theory of the Syllogism as
given in the Analytics of Aristotle, and generally admitted since. Not
merely Conceptualists, but (to use Mr Mill's own language, p. 366)
'nearly all the writers on logic, taught a theory of the science too
small and narrow to contain their own facts.' Such, indeed, was the
theory constantly taught until the publication of Mr Mill's 'System of
Logic;' the first two books of which corrected it, by arguments which
are reinforced and amplified in these two chapters on Judgment and
Reasoning, as well as in the two chapters next following--chaps, xx. and
xxi.--('Is Logic the Science of the Forms of Thought--On the
Fundamental Laws of Thought.') The contrast which is there presented, in
many different ways, between the limited theory of logic taught by Sir
W. Hamilton and Mr Mansel, and the enlarged theory of Mr Mill, is
instructive in a high degree. We consider Mr Mill as the real preserver
of all that is valuable in Formal Logic, from the unfortunate
consequences of an erroneous estimate, brought upon it through the
exaggerated pretensions of logicians. When Sir W. Hamilton contrasts it
pointedly with physical science (of which he talks with a sort of
supercilious condescension, in one of the worst passages of his
writings, p. 401)--when all its apparent fruits were produced in the
shape of ingenious but barren verbal technicalities--what hope could be
entertained that Formal Logic could hold its ground in the estimation of
the recent generation of scientific men? Mr Mill has divested it of that
assumed demonstrative authority which Bacon called 'regere res per
syllogismum;' but he has at the same time given to it a firm root amidst
the generalities of objective science. He has shown that in the great
problem of Evidence or Proof, the Laws of Formal Logic, though bearing
only on one part of the entire procedure, yet bear upon one essential
part, proper to be studied separately: and that the maintenance of
consistency between our affirmations (which is the only special province
of Formal Logic), has great importance and value as a part of the
process necessary for ascertaining and vindicating their truth, or
exposing their character when false or uncertified--but no importance or
value except as a part of that larger exigency.
While Mr Mill was amending the Syllogistic theory so as to ensure for
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