ism, for which Sir W. Hamilton takes credit, is
alike troublesome and unprofitable.
The like may also be said about his other innovation, the Quantification
of the Predicate. Still more extensive are the changes (as stated by
himself) which this innovation would introduce in the canons of
Syllogism. Indeed, when we read his language (Appendix to 'Lectures on
Logic,' pp. 291--297) censuring generally the prior logicians from
Aristotle downwards, and contending that 'more than half the value of
logic had been lost' by their manner of handling it--we may appreciate
the magnitude of the reform which he believed himself to be introducing.
The larger the reform, the more it behoved him to be sure of the ground
on which he was proceeding. But on this point we remark a serious
deficiency. After laying down, with appropriate emphasis, the valuable
logical postulate, _to state explicitly what is thought implicitly_, on
which, Sir W. Hamilton says,
'Logic ever insists, but which logicians have never fairly
obeyed--it follows that logically we ought to take into
account the quantity, _always understood in thought_, but
usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in expression, not
only of the _subject_, but also of the _predicate_, of a
judgment.'--('Discussions on Philos.,' p. 614.)
Here Sir W. Hamilton assumes that the quantity of the predicate is
always understood in thought; and the same assumption is often repeated,
in the Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' p. 291 and elsewhere, as if
it was alike obvious and incontestable. Now it is precisely on this
point that issue is here taken with Sir W. Hamilton. Mr Mill denies
altogether (p. 437) that the quantity of the predicate is always
understood or present in thought, and appeals to every reader's
consciousness for an answer:--
'Does he, when he judges that all oxen ruminate, advert even
in the minutest degree to the question, whether there is
anything else that ruminates? Is this consideration at all
in his thoughts, any more than any other consideration
foreign to the immediate subject? One person may know that
there are other ruminating animals, another may think that
there are none, a third may be without any opinion on the
subject; but if they all know what is meant by ruminating,
they all, when they judge that every ox ruminates, mean
precisely the same thing. The mental process they go
|