e substituted? Let them speak
for themselves. This one tells us that the proposed Constitution ought
to be rejected, because it is not a confederation of the States, but
a government over individuals. Another admits that it ought to be a
government over individuals to a certain extent, but by no means to
the extent proposed. A third does not object to the government over
individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to the want of a bill of
rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute necessity of a bill of rights,
but contends that it ought to be declaratory, not of the personal
rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved to the States in their
political capacity. A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any
sort would be superfluous and misplaced, and that the plan would be
unexceptionable but for the fatal power of regulating the times and
places of election. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly against
the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate. An objector
in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous inequality in
the House of Representatives. From this quarter, we are alarmed with the
amazing expense, from the number of persons who are to administer
the new government. From another quarter, and sometimes from the same
quarter, on another occasion, the cry is that the Congress will be but
a shadow of a representation, and that the government would be far less
objectionable if the number and the expense were doubled. A patriot in
a State that does not import or export, discerns insuperable objections
against the power of direct taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State
of great exports and imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole
burden of taxes may be thrown on consumption. This politician discovers
in the Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy; that
is equally sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to say
which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees clearly it
must be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not wanting, who with
no less confidence affirms that the Constitution is so far from having a
bias towards either of these dangers, that the weight on that side
will not be sufficient to keep it upright and firm against its opposite
propensities. With another class of adversaries to the Constitution the
language is that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments
are intermixed in such a manner as to contr