d the belief that, with a
lightening of the financial load, the nation would manifest its former
loyalty. On 23rd August 1791 Grenville wrote: "Our only danger is at
home, and for averting that danger, peace and economy are our best
resources."[412] These considerations are political rather than
military. But it is impossible to separate the two spheres. The strength
of the army depends ultimately on the strength of the nation.

It is also well to remember that systematic preparation for war was an
outcome of that struggle. Conscription was a bequest of the French
Revolution. Planned first by Carnot, it was carried out by Dubois Crance
and others in 1798. But in 1793 the days of large armies had not dawned.
It was usual to maintain small forces of professional soldiers, together
with a more or less inefficient militia. In England methods not unlike
those of the age of Falstaff still held good. War was an adventure, not
a science. In France first it became an intensely national effort. The
Jacobins evoked the popular enthusiasm; the Committee of Public Safety
embodied it in citizen armies; and the science of Carnot and Napoleon
led them to victories which shattered the old-world systems and baffled
the forecasts of Pitt.

Let us briefly survey the conduct of the war by Pitt in its chief stages
up to the year 1798. The first period is from the declaration of war in
February 1793, to the Battle of Fleurus, near the close of June 1794. At
the outset he is alarmed by the irruption of Dumouriez into Holland, and
hastily sends a small British force under the Duke of York, solely for
the defence of Helvoetsluys and its neighbourhood. It answers its
purpose; the French are held up at the Hollandsdiep, while the Austrians
crush their main force at Neerwinden. Thereupon Coburg claims the Duke's
assistance in driving the Republicans from the fortresses of French
Flanders. Pitt and his colleagues give their assent, because the
enterprise seems easy after the defection of Dumouriez, and Dunkirk is a
tempting prize near to hand, but mainly owing to their urgent desire
that Austria shall find her indemnity not in Bavaria, but in the French
border fortresses. Thus, for reasons which are political, rather than
military, the Cabinet embarks an insufficient force on what proves to be
a lengthy and hazardous enterprise. Further, while the British push on,
Prussia holds back; so that the Duke of York virtually takes the place
of the Prussia