at Shooter's Hill, Blackheath, on the hills
near Lee, Lewisham, Sydenham, Norwood, Streatham, Merton, and
Wandsworth. The failure of Hoche's attempt at Bantry Bay and the victory
off Cape St. Vincent somewhat assuaged these fears; but, owing to the
alarming state of Ireland, England remained on the defensive through the
years 1797-8, until Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition enabled her to
strike a crushing blow at the chief colonial enterprise of her
antagonist. That adventure, together with the aggressions of France at
Rome and in Switzerland, aroused the anger or fear of Russia, Austria,
and Naples, and thereby led up to the war of the Second Coalition.

* * * * *

Amidst the conflict of aims which distracted the Allies in the First
Coalition, Pitt's foresight was not seldom at fault. But only those who
have weighed the importance of the diplomatic issues at stake, and have
noted their warping influence on military affairs, have the right to
accuse him of blindness and presumption. The problem before him was of
unexampled complexity, and its solution could be effected only by a
succession of experiments. That he put forth too many efforts at one
time may be granted; and yet in each case, if the details are fully
known, the reasons for making the attempt seem adequate. Did not Chatham
fail in most of the expeditions which he sent against the coasts of
France? Even those who censure Pitt for his blunders in the war will
admit that the inspiring influence of his personality and patriotism
nerved the nation and Parliament for the struggle. True, the Opposition
indulged in petty nagging and in ingeniously unpatriotic tactics; but
they only served to throw up in bold relief the consistent and
courageous conduct of the Prime Minister. It was an easy task to refute
the peevish efforts of Fox to justify the French Jacobins alike before
the war, throughout its course, and in their rejection of the British
overtures for peace. But in every encounter Pitt won more than a
personal triumph. He proved that the war was forced upon us; that on our
side it was a defensive effort; and that despite the perverse conduct of
Prussia and Spain, England had won notable gains oversea and might
expect an advantageous peace, provided only that the nation persevered.

One question remains. Why did not Pitt call the nation to arms? The
reasons for his caution are doubtless to be found in the ingrained
cons