is country.
Despite the opposition of the King and Grenville to the negotiations for
peace, Pitt held firm; and early in 1796 advances were made through
Wickham, our enterprising envoy in Switzerland. They were foredoomed to
failure; on 26th March the Directory declared its resolve to listen to
no proposals involving the surrender of any of the lands incorporated in
France by the terms of the constitution of 1795. This implied that she
would retain the Rhine boundary, along with Savoy, Nice, and Avignon.
Grenville received the news with satisfaction, remarking to Wickham that
the Directory had acted clumsily and "in fact played our game better
than we could have hoped."[419] The effect on public opinion was even
better when it appeared that France expected England to surrender her
colonial conquests. That France should gain enormously on land while the
British acquisitions oversea were surrendered, was so monstrous a claim
as to arouse the temper of the nation. Even Fox admitted that if France
retained her conquests in Europe, England must keep those gained at sea.
As Pitt pointed out in his speech of 10th May 1796, the French demands
blighted all hope of peace; and we must struggle on, "waiting for the
return of reason in our deluded enemy."
Pitt regarded the French conquest of Italy as counterbalanced by the
triumph of Jervis and Nelson at Cape St. Vincent in February 1797; and
he therefore refused to consider the cession of Gibraltar to Spain.
Wholeheartedly he sought for peace in that year. But it was to be peace
with honour. In fact, Great Britain fared better after 1796 than before.
As Allies fell away or joined the enemy, her real strength began to
appear. The reasons for the paradox are not far to seek. Open enemies
are less dangerous than false friends. Further, the complexities of the
war, resulting from the conflicting aims of the Allies, vanished.
England therefore could act in the way in which Pitt would all along
have preferred her to act, namely, against the enemy's colonies. In
Europe her attitude was defensive; and for a time in the summer and
autumn of 1796 fears of invasion were rife. Accordingly the
Quarter-Master-General, Sir David Dundas, drew up a scheme of coast
defence, especially for the district between Pegwell Bay and Pevensey
Bay; he also devised measures for "driving" the country in front of the
enemy. In November of that year he recommended the construction of
batteries or entrenchments
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