d in 1795[411] was surprised to
find the large towns in a most flourishing state; and it is well known
that the exports of cottons largely increased in the last decade of the
century. Seeing that the war became "a contention of purse," the final
triumph of England may be ascribed to the reserve of strength which Pitt
had helped to assure. He did not live on to witness the issue of the
economic struggle brought about by the Continental System of Napoleon.
But a study of the commercial war of the years 1806-13 shows that Pitt's
forethought enabled Britain to foil the persistent efforts of her
mightiest enemy.
Military critics will, however, reply that Pitt's economies in the
earlier period so far weakened her army as to lead to the failures of
the Revolutionary War. There is some force in this contention. A closer
examination, however, will reveal facts that necessarily weaken it.
Firstly, England had never kept up a large army in time of peace.
Dislike of a standing army was almost inconceivably strong; and it is
certain that an attempt by Pitt to maintain an army in excess of the
ordinary peace establishment would have aroused a powerful opposition.
He therefore concentrated his efforts on the navy; and the maritime
triumphs of the war were due in the last resort to his fostering care.
As for the army, he kept it at its normal strength until the spring of
the year 1792, when he decided to effect some reductions. In one sense
this decision is creditable to him. It proves that he neither desired
nor expected a rupture with France. In his view the risks of war were
past. After his surrender to the Empress Catharine in 1791 peace seemed
assured. Further, his decision to reduce the British Army was formed
before the declaration of war by France against Austria (20th April
1792). After the rupture of France with Sardinia and Prussia it appeared
the height of madness for a single disorganized State to enlarge the
circle of its enemies. Consequently, up to the second week of November
1792, Pitt and Grenville were fully justified in expecting the duration
of peace for Great Britain. Here, as at many points in the ensuing
struggle, it was the impossible which happened.
Is Pitt to be blamed for effecting economies which led to a reduction of
taxes and an alleviation of the burdens of the poor? The chief danger of
the years 1791, 1792 came not from the French Jacobins, but from their
British sympathizers; and experience warrante
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