d himself suggested in his first conference. I
have some reason to believe that it is now intended to bring
forward immediately in Holland the same question of receiving
formal and official communication from the _Conseil Executif_. I
trust that the answer will be conformable to opinions
entertained here; and, with the view of avoiding as far as
possible, any difference, however slight, in the expression of
our sentiments, I shall lose no time in sending to Your
Excellency the copy of the answer to M. Chauvelin when it is
settled.

I cannot conclude this dispatch without again urging Your
Excellency to press in the strongest manner possible upon the
Dutch Ministers the necessity of immediately bringing forward
their whole force. It is evident that the present intentions of
France are those of aggression. Whichever of the Allies is first
attacked, there can be no doubt under the present circumstances,
but that they must make common cause in order to render the
calamity of war short, if it is unavoidable. And if the state of
the preparations of the Republic is found inadequate to the
emergency, the attack will certainly be first made there where
least resistance is expected. Every circumstance therefore, of
interest and dignity require [_sic_] that no exertion of which
the Republic can be made capable, should be spared at such a
moment as the present.[159]

Evidently Grenville looked on Chauvelin's note as an ultimatum; and it
is noteworthy that Pitt on 28th December refused to see Chauvelin. Our
Dutch Allies, however, were by no means ready. The separate Admiralties
of the Dutch Provinces had not enough men to equip, still less to man,
their ships; and almost their only defence lay in a British squadron
which set sail for Flushing on or about 29th December.[160]

For the present, then, Pitt and Grenville contented themselves with
sending a stiff rejoinder to Chauvelin's note. Grenville reminded him
that he had no official character in this country since the fall of the
French monarchy, and that the sinister meaning of the decree of 19th
November, as shown in the public reception given at Paris to the
promoters of sedition in this country, was in no wise cleared away by
his recent declaration, which still claimed the right to encourage
disloyalty. With regard to the Scheldt question, Grenville declared
again that it was of the