enville saw in it the
chief hope of peace, and that they did not desire to force royalty on
reluctant France. For them the war, if it came, was not a war of
opinion--Monarchy _versus_ Republic. It was a struggle to preserve the
Balance of Power, which in all ages our statesmen had seen to be
incompatible with the sovereignty of France in the Low Countries. That
danger averted, they were content to let France settle her own affairs,
if she behaved with the like tolerance towards her neighbours.
Unhappily, these pacific and enlightened views were not accompanied by
conciliatory manners. It was the bane of Pitt, and still more of
Grenville, that their innate reserve often cooled their friends and
heated their opponents.[166] In the case of so vain and touchy a man as
Chauvelin a little affability would have gone a long way; and this was
especially desirable, as he had enough support at Paris to thwart the
attempt to replace him by some envoy less disliked at St. James's.
Nevertheless, they persisted in their resolve not to recognize him
officially; and the Executive Council made it a point of honour to force
him on the British Court. Personal questions therefore told against a
peaceful settlement. Even at the end of the year 1792 it was not wholly
impossible, provided that the questions in dispute were treated with
open-mindedness and a desire to understand the point of view of the
opponent.
Undoubtedly it was for the French Government to take the first steps
towards reconciliation by retracting or toning down the decrees of 16th
and 19th November and 15th December, which had brought about the crisis.
Further, the Convention ought to have seen through and thwarted the
attempt of Lebrun to regain popularity by insulting Pitt in the report
of 18th December. Had that body been less intent on the party manoeuvres
centring in the trial of Louis XVI, it would assuredly not have
furthered the insidious designs of that Minister. It might have offered
to recall Chauvelin, and to substitute Maret, a man known to be a
_persona grata_ to Pitt. Finally, in view of the large concourse of
Frenchmen now in London, reckoned at 15,000, the Executive Council would
have done well to say nothing about the passing of the Aliens Bill,
obviously a precautionary measure called for by the emergency.[167]
The French Ministers took exactly the contrary course. On 30th December
they decided that Chauvelin should demand the withdrawal of that
mea
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