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oburg needed those 10,000 men because he had had no succour from the Prussian force supporting him. The result was that the Duke of York's corps was thrust into the part which the Prussian contingent ought to have taken. Accordingly Pitt and some of his colleagues deemed it preferable, now that Holland was safe, to withdraw the British troops with a view to a series of expeditions against the coasts and colonies of France. This problem called for a clear and decided solution. Nowhere do we so much lament the secrecy of Cabinet discussions as on these questions--should the meagre forces of Britain be used on maritime expeditions (their normal function in war), or form a petty division in the crusade of two great Military Powers; or, worst of all, should they be parcelled out in both kinds of warfare? All that we know is that George III, on 29th March, strongly advocated the siege of Dunkirk, in the hope that the capture of that seaport would assist the Austrians in reducing the fortresses of French Flanders, and thus put an end to the war. On the other hand, the Duke of Richmond counselled the withdrawal of the British force for use against the coasts and colonies of France; and his two letters to Pitt, dated Goodwood, 3rd and 5th April, show that Pitt inclined to that opinion. The question was important in view of a forthcoming conference of the allied commanders and envoys at Antwerp. The letters are too long for quotation. In that of 3rd April the duke declares that Ministers must soon decide whether to persevere in Flanders or in maritime expeditions. "To attempt both is to do neither well." For himself, he would much prefer to attack Cherbourg, Brest, l'Orient, Rochefort, Nantes and Bordeaux; but he fears that the ardour of the Duke of York will lead him into an extensive campaign in Flanders. In the second and longer letter, Richmond warns Pitt that, if he prefers to attack the ports and colonies of France (especially the West Indies), he ought at once to warn the envoys of the Allies at Antwerp (who were about to discuss the plan of campaign), that we could not long afford succour to them, and trusted that after six weeks they could do without it, or, at least, would need it only to a very slight extent. If, he continues, Coburg and the Prussians demur to this, we must reply that England was at first no party to the war, and entered into it only for the defence of the Dutch; that participation in a continental c
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