the British and Dutch Governments to send him succour. To this
he had some claim; for it was the Austrian victory at Neerwinden which
saved Holland from the French; and the best method of protecting that
land was to capture the northern fortresses of France. The Dutch army
numbered on paper 50,000 men; 13,500 Hanoverians were marching towards
Guelderland; 8,000 Hessians were entering the British service. In such a
case it would have been disgraceful not to assist Coburg in completing
his triumph. Thus, as often happens with British expeditions, the scope
of the Duke of York's operations now greatly widened. His original
instructions of 23rd February ordered him not to move more than
twenty-four hours away from Helvoetsluys. On 19th March, as the danger
lessened, the War Office gave him leave to advance, moving on the right
of Coburg's army towards Antwerp and Ghent.[213]

The news of Neerwinden led George III to adopt even more vigorous
measures. True, he disliked Coburg's pressing demand for help, seeing
that no treaty of alliance was formed; but he permitted the forward move
on Ghent, and formulated a still bolder scheme, that the British,
Hanoverians, and Dutch should advance to besiege Dunkirk; for the
capture of that place would enable a siege-train to be brought easily to
the Austrians for the leaguer of Lille and Valenciennes.[214] To
Grenville he expressed the hope that these measures would speedily end
the war.[215]

The letter is important as showing the great influence of the King on
military affairs. It must be remembered that Pitt, Grenville, and Dundas
(the three leading members of the Cabinet) had no knowledge of these
questions, while that shadowy personage, Sir George Yonge, Secretary at
War, had no seat in the Cabinet. A more unsatisfactory state of things
cannot be conceived. It tended to subject questions of military policy
to that influential trio, which in its turn was swayed by the will of
the King. According to constitutional custom, the Cabinet was
collectively responsible for questions of war policy; but it is
difficult to say how far Ministers were individually responsible. Pitt
and Grenville certainly influenced the decisions arrived at; Dundas drew
up and signed the chief military despatches; but the wishes of
George III had great weight.

[Illustration: SEAT OF WAR IN FLANDERS.]

In fact, questions of war policy turned largely on motives other than
military. The resolve of the King