mously decreeing war against
Great Britain and Holland. By so doing the deputies of France merely
endorsed the decision formed by the Executive Council on 10th January.

* * * * *

The outbreak of war between France and England is an event so fraught
with momentous issues to Pitt, to the two Powers, and to the whole
world, that I have striven to set forth as fully as possible every
incident, every misunderstanding, every collision of interests or
feelings, that brought it to pass. No episode in the development of the
nations of Europe is so tragic as this. That two peoples should, within
the space of nine months, abjure their friendly relations and furiously
grapple in a life and death struggle over questions of secondary
importance leads the dazed beholder at first to grope after the old
Greek idea of +ate+ or Nemesis. In reality the case does not call for
supernatural agency. The story is pitiably human, if the student will
but master its complex details. It may be well to close our study with a
few general observations, though they almost necessarily involve the
risk of over-statement.

Firstly, the position of absolute neutrality which Pitt took up from the
beginning of the troubles in France was extremely difficult to maintain
amidst the rising passions of the year 1792. The Franco-Austrian war
soon led to a situation in which the future conduct of the neutral
aroused far more suspicion, and scarcely less hatred, than that of the
enemy himself. When brains reeled with rage against tyrants; when cheeks
flushed at the thought of the woes of Marie Antoinette, correct
neutrality seemed inhuman. In an age that vibrated to the appeals of
Madame Roland and Burke, cold passivity aroused doubt or contempt. Yet
it is certain that Pitt and Grenville clung to that position, even when
its difficulties increased tenfold with the fall of the monarchy and the
September massacres. Lebrun, on coming into office after the former of
those events, was careful to inform his countrymen that the withdrawal
of the British ambassador was not an unfriendly act, and that England
was making no preparations for war. Later on he chose to represent
Pitt's conduct as persistently unfriendly; but his earlier words prove
the contrary.

Again, was it practicable (as Fox claimed) for Pitt to forbid Austria
and Prussia to coalesce against France? Probably it was not possible,
without bringing Russia and Swe