ctions," so will I add here a sort of corollary. For since men
become happy by the acquisition of happiness, while happiness is very
Godship, it is manifest that they become happy by the acquisition of
Godship. But as by the acquisition of justice men become just, and wise
by the acquisition of wisdom, so by parity of reasoning by acquiring
Godship they must of necessity become gods. So every man who is happy is
a god; and though in nature God is One only, yet there is nothing to
hinder that very many should be gods by participation in that nature.'
'A fair conclusion, and a precious,' said I, 'deduction or corollary, by
whichever name thou wilt call it.'
'And yet,' said she, 'not one whit fairer than this which reason
persuades us to add.'
'Why, what?' said I.
'Why, seeing happiness has many particulars included under it, should
all these be regarded as forming one body of happiness, as it were, made
up of various parts, or is there some one of them which forms the full
essence of happiness, while all the rest are relative to this?'
'I would thou wouldst unfold the whole matter to me at large.'
'We judge happiness to be good, do we not?'
'Yea, the supreme good.'
'And this superlative applies to all; for this same happiness is
adjudged to be the completest independence, the highest power,
reverence, renown, and pleasure.'
'What then?'
'Are all these goods--independence, power, and the rest--to be deemed
members of happiness, as it were, or are they all relative to good as to
their summit and crown?'
'I understand the problem, but I desire to hear how thou wouldst solve
it.'
'Well, then, listen to the determination of the matter. Were all these
members composing happiness, they would differ severally one from the
other. For this is the nature of parts--that by their difference they
compose one body. All these, however, have been proved to be the same;
therefore they cannot possibly be members, otherwise happiness will seem
to be built up out of one member, which cannot be.'
'There can be no doubt as to that,' said I; 'but I am impatient to hear
what remains.'
'Why, it is manifest that all the others are relative to the good. For
the very reason why independence is sought is that it is judged good,
and so power also, because it is believed to be good. The same, too, may
be supposed of reverence, of renown, and of pleasant delight. Good,
then, is the sum and source of all desirable things. T
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