e they who can
do evil also are not omnipotent, it is manifest that they who can do
evil have less power. There is this also: we have shown that all power
is to be reckoned among things desirable, and that all desirable things
are referred to good as to a kind of consummation of their nature. But
the ability to commit crime cannot be referred to the good; therefore it
is not a thing to be desired. And yet all power is desirable; it is
clear, then, that ability to do evil is not power. From all which
considerations appeareth the power of the good, and the indubitable
weakness of the bad, and it is clear that Plato's judgment was true; the
wise alone are able to do what they would, while the wicked follow their
own hearts' lust, but can _not_ accomplish what they would. For they go
on in their wilfulness fancying they will attain what they wish for in
the paths of delight; but they are very far from its attainment, since
shameful deeds lead not to happiness.'

FOOTNOTES:

[K] The paradoxes in this chapter and chapter iv. are taken from Plato's
'Gorgias.' See Jowett, vol. ii., pp. 348-366, and also pp. 400, 401
('Gorgias,' 466-479, and 508, 509).

[L]

'No trivial game is here; the strife Is waged for Turnus' own dear
life.'

_Conington_.

See Virgil, AEneid,' xii. 764, 745: _cf_. 'Iliad,' xxii. 159-162.

SONG II.

THE BONDAGE OF PASSION.

When high-enthroned the monarch sits, resplendent in the pride
Of purple robes, while flashing steel guards him on every side;
When baleful terrors on his brow with frowning menace lower,
And Passion shakes his labouring breast--how dreadful seems his power!
But if the vesture of his state from such a one thou tear,
Thou'lt see what load of secret bonds this lord of earth doth wear.
Lust's poison rankles; o'er his mind rage sweeps in tempest rude;
Sorrow his spirit vexes sore, and empty hopes delude.
Then thou'lt confess: one hapless wretch, whom many lords oppress,
Does never what he would, but lives in thraldom's helplessness.

III.

'Thou seest, then, in what foulness unrighteous deeds are sunk, with
what splendour righteousness shines. Whereby it is manifest that
goodness never lacks its reward, nor crime its punishment. For, verily,
in all manner of transactions that for the sake of which the particular
action is done may justly be accounted the reward of that action, even
as the wreath for the sake of which the rac