way, then, if Providence sees
anything as present, that must necessarily be, though it is bound by no
necessity of nature. Now, God views as present those coming events which
happen of free will. These, accordingly, from the standpoint of the
Divine vision are made necessary conditionally on the Divine
cognizance; viewed, however, in themselves, they desist not from the
absolute freedom naturally theirs. Accordingly, without doubt, all
things will come to pass which God foreknows as about to happen, but of
these certain proceed of free will; and though these happen, yet by the
fact of their existence they do not lose their proper nature, in virtue
of which before they happened it was really possible that they might not
have come to pass.
'What difference, then, does the denial of necessity make, since,
through their being conditioned by Divine knowledge, they come to pass
as if they were in all respects under the compulsion of necessity? This
difference, surely, which we saw in the case of the instances I formerly
took, the sun's rising and the man's walking; which at the moment of
their occurrence could not but be taking place, and yet one of them
before it took place was necessarily obliged to be, while the other was
not so at all. So likewise the things which to God are present without
doubt exist, but some of them come from the necessity of things, others
from the power of the agent. Quite rightly, then, have we said that
these things are necessary if viewed from the standpoint of the Divine
knowledge; but if they are considered in themselves, they are free from
the bonds of necessity, even as everything which is accessible to sense,
regarded from the standpoint of Thought, is universal, but viewed in its
own nature particular. "But," thou wilt say, "if it is in my power to
change my purpose, I shall make void providence, since I shall perchance
change something which comes within its foreknowledge." My answer is:
Thou canst indeed turn aside thy purpose; but since the truth of
providence is ever at hand to see that thou canst, and whether thou
dost, and whither thou turnest thyself, thou canst not avoid the Divine
foreknowledge, even as thou canst not escape the sight of a present
spectator, although of thy free will thou turn thyself to various
actions. Wilt thou, then, say: "Shall the Divine knowledge be changed at
my discretion, so that, when I will this or that, providence changes its
knowledge correspondingl
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