ly suppose that He who is the Father of all things hath
received that highest good of which He is said to be possessed either
from some external source, or hath it as a natural endowment in such
sort that thou mightest consider the essence of the happiness possessed,
and of the God who possesses it, distinct and different. For if thou
deemest it received from without, thou mayst esteem that which gives
more excellent than that which has received. But Him we most worthily
acknowledge to be the most supremely excellent of all things. If,
however, it is in Him by nature, yet is logically distinct, the thought
is inconceivable, since we are speaking of God, who is supreme of all
things. Who was there to join these distinct essences? Finally, when one
thing is different from another, the things so conceived as distinct
cannot be identical. Therefore that which of its own nature is distinct
from the highest good is not itself the highest good--an impious thought
of Him than whom, 'tis plain, nothing can be more excellent. For
universally nothing can be better in nature than the source from which
it has come; therefore on most true grounds of reason would I conclude
that which is the source of all things to be in its own essence the
highest good.'

'And most justly,' said I.

'But the highest good has been admitted to be happiness.'

'Yes.'

'Then,' said she, 'it is necessary to acknowledge that God is very
happiness.'

'Yes,' said I; 'I cannot gainsay my former admissions, and I see clearly
that this is a necessary inference therefrom.'

'Reflect, also,' said she, 'whether the same conclusion is not further
confirmed by considering that there cannot be two supreme goods distinct
one from the other. For the goods which are different clearly cannot be
severally each what the other is: wherefore neither of the two can be
perfect, since to either the other is wanting; but since it is not
perfect, it cannot manifestly be the supreme good. By no means, then,
can goods which are supreme be different one from the other. But we have
concluded that both happiness and God are the supreme good; wherefore
that which is highest Divinity must also itself necessarily be supreme
happiness.'

'No conclusion,' said I, 'could be truer to fact, nor more soundly
reasoned out, nor more worthy of God.'

'Then, further,' said she, 'just as geometricians are wont to draw
inferences from their demonstrations to which they give the name
"dedu