I, 'if only I were so blest as to learn to know
God also who is the good.'
'Yet this will I make clear to thee on truest grounds of reason, if only
our recent conclusions stand fast.'
'They will.'
'Have we not shown that those things which most men desire are not true
and perfect good precisely for this cause--that they differ severally
one from another, and, seeing that one is wanting to another, they
cannot bestow full and absolute good; but that they become the true good
when they are gathered, as it were, into one form and agency, so that
that which is independence is likewise power, reverence, renown, and
pleasant delight, and unless they are all one and the same, they have no
claim to be counted among things desirable?'
'Yes; this was clearly proved, and cannot in any wise be doubted.'
'Now, when things are far from being good while they are different, but
become good as soon as they are one, is it not true that these become
good by acquiring unity?'
'It seems so,' said I.
'But dost not thou allow that all which is good is good by participation
in goodness?'
'It is.'
'Then, thou must on similar grounds admit that unity and goodness are
the same; for when the effects of things in their natural working differ
not, their essence is one and the same.'
'There is no denying it.'
'Now, dost thou know,' said she, 'that all which is abides and subsists
so long as it continues one, but so soon as it ceases to be one it
perishes and falls to pieces?'
'In what way?'
'Why, take animals, for example. When soul and body come together, and
continue in one, this is, we say, a living creature; but when this unity
is broken by the separation of these two, the creature dies, and is
clearly no longer living. The body also, while it remains in one form by
the joining together of its members, presents a human appearance; but if
the separation and dispersal of the parts break up the body's unity, it
ceases to be what it was. And if we extend our survey to all other
things, without doubt it will manifestly appear that each several thing
subsists while it is one, but when it ceases to be one perishes.'
'Yes; when I consider further, I see it to be even as thou sayest.'
'Well, is there aught,' said she, 'which, in so far as it acts
conformably to nature, abandons the wish for life, and desires to come
to death and corruption?'
'Looking to living creatures, which have some faults of choice, I find
none t
|