hem good: only keep me not in suspense after
raising such hopes.'
'Learn, then, first,' said she, 'how that power ever waits upon the
good, while the bad are left wholly destitute of strength.[K] Of these
truths the one proves the other; for since good and evil are contraries,
if it is made plain that good is power, the feebleness of evil is
clearly seen, and, conversely, if the frail nature of evil is made
manifest, the strength of good is thereby known. However, to win ampler
credence for my conclusion, I will pursue both paths, and draw
confirmation for my statements first in one way and then in the other.
'The carrying out of any human action depends upon two things--to wit,
will and power; if either be wanting, nothing can be accomplished. For
if the will be lacking, no attempt at all is made to do what is not
willed; whereas if there be no power, the will is all in vain. And so,
if thou seest any man wishing to attain some end, yet utterly failing to
attain it, thou canst not doubt that he lacked the power of getting what
he wished for.'
'Why, certainly not; there is no denying it.'
'Canst thou, then, doubt that he whom thou seest to have accomplished
what he willed had also the power to accomplish it?'
'Of course not.'
'Then, in respect of what he can accomplish a man is to be reckoned
strong, in respect of what he cannot accomplish weak?'
'Granted,' said I.
'Then, dost thou remember that, by our former reasonings, it was
concluded that the whole aim of man's will, though the means of pursuit
vary, is set intently upon happiness?'
'I do remember that this, too, was proved.'
'Dost thou also call to mind how happiness is absolute good, and
therefore that, when happiness is sought, it is good which is in all
cases the object of desire?'
'Nay, I do not so much call to mind as keep it fixed in my memory.'
'Then, all men, good and bad alike, with one indistinguishable purpose
strive to reach good?'
'Yes, that follows.'
'But it is certain that by the attainment of good men become good?'
'It is.'
'Then, do the good attain their object?'
'It seems so.'
'But if the bad were to attain the good which is _their_ object, they
could not be bad?'
'No.'
'Then, since both seek good, but while the one sort attain it, the other
attain it not, is there any doubt that the good are endued with power,
while they who are bad are weak?'
'If any doubt it, he is incapable of reflecting on th
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