ately, and then consider by what tie they are connected, and
wherein they resemble one another. The hardness of the table is the
conclusion, the feeling is the medium by which we are led to that
conclusion. Let a man attend distinctly to this medium, and to the
conclusion, and he will perceive them to be as unlike as any two things
in nature. The one is a sensation of the mind, which can have no
existence but in a sentient being; nor can it exist one moment longer
than it is felt; the other is in the table, and we conclude, without
any difficulty, that it was in the table before it was felt, and
continues after the feeling is over. The one implies no kind of
extension, nor parts, nor cohesion; the other implies all these. Both,
indeed, admit of degrees, and the feeling, beyond a certain degree, is
a species of pain; but adamantine hardness does not imply the least
pain.

"And as the feeling hath no similitude to hardness, so neither can our
reason perceive the least tie or connection between them; nor will the
logician ever be able to show a reason why we should conclude hardness
from this feeling, rather than softness, or any other quality
whatsoever. But, in reality, all mankind are led by their constitution
to conclude hardness from this feeling."

It is well worth while to read this extract several times, and to ask
oneself what Reid meant to say, and what he actually said. He is
objecting, be it remembered, to the doctrine that the mind perceives
immediately only its own ideas or sensations and must infer all else.
His contention is that we _perceive_ external things.

Does he say this? He says that we have feelings of touch _from which
we conclude_ that there is something external; that there is a feeling,
"_and a conclusion drawn from it, or some way suggested by it_;" that
"the hardness of the table is the _conclusion_, and the feeling is the
_medium_ by which we are _led to the conclusion_."

Could Descartes or Locke have more plainly supported the doctrine of
representative perception? How could Reid imagine he was combatting
that doctrine when he wrote thus? The point in which he differs from
them is this: he maintains that we draw the conclusion in question
without any reasoning, and, indeed, in the absence of any conceivable
reason why we should draw it. We do it instinctively; we are led by
the constitution of our nature.

In effect Reid says to us: When you lay your hand on the table, you