ng the popular burden might seem to be constitutionally
irresistible, but by adroit maneuvering the congressional supporters of
protection managed to have the war rates generally maintained and, in
some cases, even increased. The case is a typical example of the way
in which advantage of strategic position in a governmental system can
prevail against mere numbers.

By the Act of May 15, 1882, a tariff commission was created to examine
the industrial situation and make recommendations as to rates of duty.
The President appointed men who stood high in the commercial world
and who were strongly attached to the protective system. They applied
themselves to their task with such energy that by December 4, 1882, they
had produced a voluminous report with suggested amendments to customs
laws.

But the advocates of high protection in the House were not satisfied;
they opposed the recommendations of the report and urged that the best
and quickest way to reduce taxation was by abolishing or reducing items
on the internal revenue list. This policy not only commanded support on
the Republican side, but also received the aid of a Democratic faction
which avowed protectionist principles and claimed party sanction for
them. These political elements in the House were strong enough to
prevent action on the customs tariff, but a bill was passed reducing
some of the internal revenue taxes. This action seemed likely to prevent
tariff revision at least during that session. Formidable obstacles, both
constitutional and parliamentary, stood in the way of action, but they
were surmounted by ingenious management.

The Constitution provides that all revenue bills shall originate in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate has the right to propose
amendments. Under cover of this clause the Senate originated a
voluminous tariff bill and tacked it to the House bill as an amendment.
When the bill, as thus amended, came back to the House, a two-thirds
vote would have been required by the existing rules to take it up for
consideration, but this obstacle was overcome by adopting a new rule
by which a bare majority of the House could forthwith take up a bill
amended by the Senate, for the purpose of non-concurrence but not for
concurrence. The object of this maneuver was to get the bill into a
committee of conference where the details could be arranged by private
negotiation. The rule was adopted on February 26, 1883, but the
committee of conferen