sitor of his opinions to speak very
guardedly on this point) that the problem of theism is susceptible of
scientific treatment, with something more than a negative result. His
opinions are to be gathered from the eleventh section of the _Inquiry_
(1748); from the _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, which were
written at least as early as 1751, though not published till after his
death; and from the _Natural History of Religion_, published in 1757.

In the first two pieces, the reader is left to judge for himself which
interlocutor in the dialogue represents the thoughts of the author; but,
for the views put forward in the last, Hume accepts the responsibility.
Unfortunately, this essay deals almost wholly with the historical
development of theological ideas; and, on the question of the
philosophical foundation of theology, does little more than express the
writer's contentment with the argument from design.

"The whole frame of nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author; and no
rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief
a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism
and Religion.--(IV. p. 435.)

"Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent
power, by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never
possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who
bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all
its parts according to one regular plan or connected system. For
though, to persons of a certain turn of mind, it may not appear
altogether absurd, that several independent beings, endowed with
superior wisdom, might conspire in the contrivance and execution of
one regular plan, yet is this a merely arbitrary supposition,
which, even if allowed possible, must be confessed neither to be
supported by probability nor necessity. All things in the universe
are evidently of a piece. Everything is adjusted to everything. One
design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the
mind to acknowledge one author; because the conception of different
authors, without any distinction of attributes or operations,
serves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without
bestowing any satisfaction on the understanding."--(IV. p. 442.)

Thus Hume appears to have sincerely accepted the two fundamental
conclusions of the argument