not account
fully for these irregularities. It may explain, indeed, how present evil
may be conducive to future good, but not why the good could not be
attained without the evil; it may reconcile with our notions of the
divine justice the present prosperity of the wicked, but it does not
account for the existence of the wicked."--Whately, _l.c._ pp. 69, 70.

[43] "So reason also shows, that for man to expect to earn for himself
by the practice of virtue, and claim, as his just right, an immortality
of exalted happiness, is a most extravagant and groundless
pretension."--Whately, _l.c._ p. 101. On the other hand, however, the
Archbishop sees no unreasonableness in a man's earning for himself an
immortality of intense unhappiness by the practice of vice. So that life
is, naturally, a venture in which you may lose all, but can earn
nothing. It may be thought somewhat hard upon mankind if they are pushed
into a speculation of this sort, willy-nilly.

[44] _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_. Ed. Hartenstein, p. 547.

CHAPTER X.

VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

In the opening paragraphs of the third part of the second book of the
_Treatise_, Hume gives a description of the will.

"Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure there is none
more remarkable than the _will_; and though, properly speaking, it
be not comprehended among the passions, yet as the full
understanding of its nature and properties is necessary to the
explanation of them, we shall here make it the subject of our
inquiry. I desire it may be observed, that, by the _will_, I mean
nothing but _the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of,
when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new
perception of our mind_. This impression, like the preceding ones
of pride and humility, love and hatred, 'tis impossible to define,
and needless to describe any further."--(II. p. 150.)

This description of volition may be criticised on various grounds. More
especially does it seem defective in restricting the term "will" to that
feeling which arises when we act, or appear to act, as causes: for one
may will to strike, without striking; or to think of something which we
have forgotten.

Every volition is a complex idea composed of two elements: the one is
the idea of an action; the other is a desire for the occurrence of that
action. If I will to strike, I have an idea of a certa