the want of that
determination, and a certain looseness or indifference which we
feel, in passing or not passing, from the idea of any object to the
idea of any succeeding one. Now we may observe that though, in
_reflecting_ on human actions, we seldom feel such looseness or
indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable
certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the
agent; yet it frequently happens, that in _performing_ the actions
themselves, we are sensible of something like it: And as all
resembling objects are taken for each other, this has been employed
as demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel
that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions; and
imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing,
because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel
that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or
a _Velleity_ as it is called in the schools), even on that side on
which it did not settle. This image or faint notion, we persuade
ourselves, could at that time have been completed into the thing
itself; because, should that be denied, we find upon a second trial
that at present it can. We consider not that the fantastical desire
of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions."--(IV. p.
110, _note_.)

Moreover, the moment the attempt is made to give a definite meaning to
the words, the supposed opposition between free will and necessity turns
out to be a mere verbal dispute.

"For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions?
We cannot surely mean, that actions have so little connexion with
motive, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow
with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one
affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the
other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By
liberty, then, we can only mean _a power of acting or not acting
according to the determinations of the will_; that is, if we choose
to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now
this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every
one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of
dispute."--(IV. p. 111.)

Half the controversie