fficient
assurance that he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the
catalogue, or incurs any danger of misplacing the objects of his
contemplation: He needs only enter into his own breast for a
moment, and consider whether he should or should not desire to have
this or that quality assigned to him, and whether such or such an
imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. The very nature
of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of
this nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words which
are taken in a good sense, and another in the opposite, the least
acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to
direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blamable
qualities of men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the
circumstances on both sides, which are common to these qualities;
to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree
on the one hand, and the blamable on the other, and thence to reach
the foundation of ethics, and find their universal principles, from
which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is
a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect
success by following the experimental method, and deducing general
maxims from a comparison of particular instances. The other
scientifical method, where a general abstract principle is first
established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of
inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but
suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source
of illusion and mistake, in this as well as in other subjects. Men
are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in
natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those
which are derived from experience. It is full time they should
attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject
every system of ethics, however subtile or ingenious, which is not
founded on fact and observation."--(IV. pp. 242-4.)
No qualities give a man a greater claim to personal merit than
benevolence and justice; but if we inquire why benevolence deserves so
much praise, the answer will certainly contain a large reference to the
utility of that virtue to society; and as for justice, the very
existence of the v
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