FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   120   121   122   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144  
145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153   154   155   156   157   158   159   160   161   162   163   164   >>  
egen seines noch hoeheren Grundes erfahren."--_Kritik._ Ed. Hartenstein, p. 422. [32] _I.e._ Natural philosophers. [33] Hume's letter to Mure of Caldwell, containing a criticism of Leechman's sermon (Burton, I. p. 163), bears strongly on this point. [34] Burns published the _Holy Fair_ only ten years after Hume's death. CHAPTER IX. THE SOUL: THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY. Descartes taught that an absolute difference of kind separates matter, as that which possesses extension, from spirit, as that which thinks. They not only have no character in common, but it is inconceivable that they should have any. On the assumption, that the attributes of the two were wholly different, it appeared to be a necessary consequence that the hypothetical causes of these attributes--their respective substances--must be totally different. Notably, in the matter of divisibility, since that which has no extension cannot be divisible, it seemed that the _chose pensante_, the soul, must be an indivisible entity. Later philosophers, accepting this notion of the soul, were naturally much perplexed to understand how, if matter and spirit had nothing in common, they could act and react on one another. All the changes of matter being modes of motion, the difficulty of understanding how a moving extended material body was to affect a thinking thing which had no dimension, was as great as that involved in solving the problem of how to hit a nominative case with a stick. Hence, the successors of Descartes either found themselves obliged, with the Occasionalists, to call in the aid of the Deity, who was supposed to be a sort of go-between betwixt matter and spirit; or they had recourse, with Leibnitz, to the doctrine of pre-established harmony, which denied any influence of the body on the soul, or _vice versa_, and compared matter and spirit to two clocks so accurately regulated to keep time with one another, that the one struck when ever the other pointed to the hour; or, with Berkeley, they abolished the "substance" of matter altogether, as a superfluity, though they failed to see that the same arguments equally justified the abolition of soul as another superfluity, and the reduction of the universe to a series of events or phenomena; or, finally, with Spinoza, to whom Berkeley makes a perilously close approach, they asserted the existence of only one substance, with two chief attributes, the one, thought, and the other, extens
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   120   121   122   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144  
145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152   153   154   155   156   157   158   159   160   161   162   163   164   >>  



Top keywords:
matter
 

spirit

 

attributes

 
Berkeley
 
substance
 
Descartes
 

extension

 

common

 

superfluity

 

philosophers


supposed
 
extended
 

material

 

moving

 

motion

 

recourse

 

difficulty

 

understanding

 

betwixt

 

affect


involved
 

seines

 

problem

 
nominative
 

successors

 
obliged
 
Occasionalists
 

thinking

 

dimension

 

solving


universe

 

reduction

 
series
 
events
 

phenomena

 
abolition
 

justified

 

arguments

 

equally

 

finally


Spinoza

 

existence

 
thought
 

extens

 
asserted
 
approach
 

perilously

 

failed

 
compared
 

clocks