he
imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each
other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future
pains or pleasures.

"As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of
this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be considered, upon that
account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no
memory we never should have any notion of causation, nor
consequently of that chain of causes and effects which constitute
our self or person. But having once acquired this notion of
causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes,
and consequently the identity of our persons, beyond our memory,
and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we
have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. For
how few of our past actions are there of which we have any memory?
Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions
on the first of January, 1715, the eleventh of March, 1719, and the
third of August, 1733? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely
forgot the incidents of those days, that the present self is not
the same person with the self of that time, and by that means
overturn all the most established notions of personal identity? In
this view, therefore, memory does not so much _produce_ as
_discover_ personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause
and effect among our different perceptions. 'Twill be incumbent on
those who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal
identity, to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity
beyond our memory.

"The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion which is of
great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and
subtle questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be
decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as
philosophical difficulties. Identity depends on the relations of
ideas, and these relations produce identity by means of that easy
transition they occasion. But as the relations, and the easiness of
the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we have no just
standard by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time
when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the
disputes concerning the i