n character, as are both slopes of the valley itself, which are
broken into numerous rounded spurs and re-entrants. The most prominent
of the former are the Chivre spur on the right bank and Sermoise spur on
the left. Near the latter place the general plateau, on the south is
divided by a subsidiary valley of much the same character, down which
the small River Vesle flows to the main stream near Sermoise. The slopes
of the plateau overlooking the Aisne on the north and south are of
varying steepness, and are covered with numerous patches of wood, which
also stretch upward and backward over the edge on to the top of the high
ground. There are several villages and small towns dotted about in the
valley itself and along its sides, the chief of which is the town of
Soissons.
The Aisne is a sluggish stream of some 170 feet in breadth, but, being
15 feet deep in the centre, it is unfordable. Between Soissons on the
west and Villiers on the east (the part of the river attacked and
secured by the British forces) there are eleven road bridges across it.
On the north bank a narrow-gauge railway runs from Soissons to Vailly,
where it crosses the river and continues eastward along the south bank.
From Soissons to Sermoise a double line of railway runs along the south
bank, turning at the latter place up the Vesle Valley toward Bazoches.
The position held by the enemy is a very strong one, either for delaying
action or for a defensive battle. One of its chief military
characteristics is that from the high ground on neither side can the top
of the plateau on the other side be seen, except for small stretches.
This is chiefly due to the woods on the edges of the slopes. Another
important point is that all the bridges are under direct or high-angle
artillery fire.
The tract of country above described, which lies north of the Aisne, is
well adapted to concealment, and was so skillfully turned to account by
the enemy as to render it impossible to judge the real nature of his
opposition to our passage of the river or accurately to gauge his
strength; but I have every reason to conclude that strong rearguards of
at least three army corps were holding the passages on the early morning
of the 13th.
3. On that morning I ordered the British forces to advance and make good
the Aisne.
The First Corps and the cavalry advanced on the river. The First
Division was directed on Chamouille via the canal bridge at Bourg, and
the Second Divis
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