east and west along one side of a
valley. At another almost north and south up some subsidiary valley.
Here they line the edge of woods, and there they are on the reverse
slope of a hill, or possibly along a sunken road, and at different
points both the German and the British trenches jut out like
promontories into what might be regarded as the opponents' territory.

Though both sides have moved forward at certain points, and withdrawn at
others, no very important change has been effected in their
dispositions, in spite of the enemy's repeated counter attacks. These
have been directed principally against one portion of the position won
by us, but in spite of the lavish expenditure of life they have not so
far succeeded in driving us back.

The situation of the works in the German front line as a whole has been
a matter of deliberate selection, for they have had the advantage of
previous reconnaissance, being first in the field.

Behind the front they now have several lines prepared for a step-by-step
defense. Another point which might cause astonishment to a visitor to
our intrenchments is the evident indifference displayed to the provision
of an extended field of frontal rifle fire, which is generally accepted
as being one of the great requirements of a defensive position. It is
still desirable, if it can be obtained without the usually accompanying
drawback of exposure to the direct fire of hostile artillery, but
experience has shown that a short field of fire is sufficient to beat
back the infantry assaults of the enemy, and by giving up direct fire at
long or medium ranges and placing our trenches on the reverse slope of a
hill or behind the crest, it is in many places possible to gain shelter
from the frontal fire of the German guns, for the men are well trained
in musketry and under good fire control, and the dead ground beyond the
short range from their position has comparatively small terrors.

Many of the front trenches of the Germans equally lack a distant field
of fire, but if lost they would be rendered untenable by us by the fact
that they would be exposed to a fire from the German guns in the rear
and to cross-rifle fire from neighboring works.

The extent to which cross-fire of all kinds is employed is also
remarkable. Many localities and areas along the Aisne are not swept from
the works directly in front of them, but are rendered untenable by
rifle fire from neighboring features or by that of guns t