r doctrine in philosophy to which
I give the name of radical empiricism, and it seems to me that the
establishment of the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate
importance in making radical empiricism prevail" (p. xii).
In preparing the present volume, the editor has therefore been governed
by two motives. On the one hand, he has sought to preserve and make
accessible certain important articles not to be found in Professor
James's other books. This is true of Essays I, II, IV, V, VIII, IX, X,
XI, and XII. On the other hand, he has sought to bring together in one
volume a set of essays treating systematically of one independent,
coherent, and fundamental doctrine. To this end it has seemed best to
include three essays (III, VI, and VII), which, although included in the
original plan, were afterwards reprinted elsewhere; and one essay, XII,
not included in the original plan. Essays III, VI, and VII are
indispensable to the consecutiveness of the series, and are so
interwoven with the rest that it is necessary that the student should
have them at hand for ready consultation. Essay XII throws an important
light on the author's general 'empiricism,' and forms an important link
between 'radical empiricism' and the author's other doctrines.
In short, the present volume is designed not as a collection but rather
as a treatise. It is intended that another volume shall be issued which
shall contain papers having biographical or historical importance which
have not yet been reprinted in book form. The present volume is intended
not only for students of Professor James's philosophy, but for students
of metaphysics and the theory of knowledge. It sets forth systematically
and within brief compass the doctrine of 'radical empiricism.'
A word more may be in order concerning the general meaning of this
doctrine. In the Preface to the _Will to Believe_ (1898), Professor
James gives the name "_radical empiricism_" to his "philosophic
attitude," and adds the following explanation: "I say 'empiricism,'
because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions
concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the
course of future experience; and I say 'radical,' because it treats the
doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unlike so much of the
halfway empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or
agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm
monism as some
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