nning
and even the capital was not occupied. In ten or twelve days
an army three times as strong as the troops of Caesar
that were in Upper Italy could be collected at Rome; but still
it was not impossible to surprise the city undefended, or even perhaps
by a rapid winter campaign to seize all Italy, and to shut off
the best resources of his opponents before they could make them available.
The sagacious and energetic Curio, who after resigning his tribunate
(10 Dec. 704) had immediately gone to Caesar at Ravenna,
vividly represented the state of things to his master;
and it hardly needed such a representation to convince Caesar
that longer delay now could only be injurious. But, as he with the view
of not giving his antagonists occasion to complain had hitherto
brought no troops to Ravenna itself, he could for the present do nothing
but despatch orders to his whole force to set out with all haste;
and he had to wait till at least the one legion stationed in Upper Italy
reached Ravenna. Meanwhile he sent an ultimatum to Rome,
which, if useful for nothing else, by its extreme submissiveness
still farther compromised his opponents in public opinion,
and perhaps even, as he seemed himself to hesitate, induced them
to prosecute more remissly their preparations against him.
In this ultimatum Caesar dropped all the counter-demands
which he formerly made on Pompeius, and offered on his own part
both to resign the governorship of Transalpine Gaul, and to dismiss
eight of the ten legions belonging to him, at the term fixed
by the senate; he declared himself content, if the senate would leave him
either the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with one,
or that of Cisalpine Gaul alone with two, legions, not, forsooth,
up to his investiture with the consulship, but till after the close
of the consular elections for 706. He thus consented to those proposals
of accommodation, with which at the beginning of the discussions
the senatorial party and even Pompeius himself had declared
that they would be satisfied, and showed himself ready to remain
in a private position from his election to the consulate down to
his entering on office. Whether Caesar was in earnest with these
astonishing concessions and had confidence that he should be able
to carry through his game against Pompeius even after granting
so much, or whether he reckoned that those on the other side
had already gone too far to find in these proposals of compromis