own more lukewarm
partisans and Pompeius with his personal adherents, if possible,
still more than their open opponents, and that with all the dull
obstinacy of hatred which is wont to characterize orthodox theologians;
and they were mainly to blame for the numberless and bitter
separate quarrels which distracted the emigrant army and emigrant senate.
But they did not confine themselves to words. Marcus Bibulus,
Titus Labienus, and others of this coterie carried out their theory
in practice, and caused such officers or soldiers of Caesar's army
as fell into their hands to be executed en masse; which,
as may well be conceived, did not tend to make Caesar's troops
fight with less energy. If the counterrevolution in favour
of the friends of the constitution, for which all the elements
were in existence,(24) did not break out in Italy during
Caesar's absence, the reason, according to the assurance
of discerning opponents of Caesar, lay chiefly in the general dread
of the unbridled fury of the republican ultras after the restoration
should have taken place. The better men in the Pompeian camp
were in despair over this frantic behaviour. Pompeius, himself
a brave soldier, spared the prisoners as far as he might and could;
but he was too pusillanimous and in too awkward a position to prevent
or even to punish all atrocities of this sort, as it became him
as commander-in-chief to do. Marcus Cato, the only man who at least
carried moral consistency into the struggle, attempted with more energy
to check such proceedings; he induced the emigrant senate
to prohibit by a special decree the pillage of subject towns
and the putting to death of a burgess otherwise than in battle.
The able Marcus Marcellus had similar views. No one, indeed,
knew better than Cato and Marcellus that the extreme party
would carry out their saving deeds, if necessary, in defiance
of all decrees of the senate. But if even now, when they had still
to regard considerations of prudence, the rage of the ultras
could not be tamed, people might prepare themselves after the victory
for a reign of terror from which Marius and Sulla themselves
would have turned away with horror; and we can understand why Cato,
according to his own confession, was more afraid of the victory
than of the defeat of his own party.

The Preparations for War

The management of the military preparations in the Macedonian camp
was in the hands of Pompeius the commander-in-chief. Hi