tions no doubt, which were thus required by Caesar
from his soldiers, thinned the ranks more than their conflicts had done
and the mutiny of one of the four oldest legions, the ninth
on its march through Placentia was a dangerous indication
of the temper prevailing in the army; but Caesar's presence of mind
and personal authority gained the mastery, and from this quarter
nothing impeded the embarkation. But the want of ships, through which
the pursuit of Pompeius had failed in March 705, threatened also
to frustrate this expedition. The war-vessels, which Caesar
had given orders to build in the Gallic, Sicilian, and Italian ports,
were not yet ready or at any rate not on the spot; his squadron
in the Adriatic had been in the previous year destroyed at Curicta;(27)
he found at Brundisium not more than twelve ships of war
and scarcely transports enough to convey over at once the third part
of his army--of twelve legions and 10,000 cavalry--destined for Greece.
The considerable fleet of the enemy exclusively commanded
the Adriatic and especially all the harbours of the mainland
and islands on its eastern coast. Under such circumstances
the question presents itself, why Caesar did not instead
of the maritime route choose the land route through Illyria,
which relieved him from all the perils threatened by the fleet
and besides was shorter for his troops, who mostly came from Gaul,
than the route by Brundisium. It is true that the regions
of Illyria were rugged and poor beyond description; but they
were traversed by other armies not long afterwards, and this obstacle
can hardly have appeared insurmountable to the conqueror of Gaul.
Perhaps he apprehended that during the troublesome march
through Illyria Pompeius might convey his whole force over the Adriatic,
whereby their parts might come at once to be changed--with Caesar
in Macedonia, and Pompeius in Italy; although such a rapid change
was scarcely to be expected from his slow-moving antagonist.
Perhaps Caesar had decided for the maritime route on the supposition
that his fleet would meanwhile be brought into a condition
to command respect, and, when after his return from Spain
he became aware of the true state of things in the Adriatic,
it might be too late to change the plan of campaign. Perhaps--
and, in accordance with Caesar's quick temperament always urging him
to decision, we may even say in all probability--he found himself
irresistibly tempted by the circums