far, since by the occupation of Sicily
in connection with that of Sardinia at least the most urgent wants
of the capital were relieved; the miscarriage of the conquest of Africa--
from which the victorious party drew no farther substantial gain--
and the loss of two untrustworthy legions might be got over.
But the early death of Curio was an irreparable loss for Caesar,
and indeed for Rome. Not without reason had Caesar entrusted
the most important independent command to this young man, although
he had no military experience and was notorious for his dissolute life;
there was a spark of Caesar's own spirit in the fiery youth.
He resembled Caesar, inasmuch as he too had drained the cup of pleasure
to the dregs; inasmuch as he did not become a statesman
because he was an officer, but on the contrary it was his political
action that placed the sword in his hands; inasmuch as
his eloquence was not that of rounded periods, but the eloquence
of deeply-felt thought; inasmuch as his mode of warfare was based
on rapid action with slight means; inasmuch as his character
was marked by levity and often by frivolity, by pleasant frankness
and thorough life in the moment. If, as his general says of him,
youthful fire and high courage carried him into incautious acts,
and if he too proudly accepted death that he might not submit
to be pardoned for a pardonable fault, traits of similar imprudence
and similar pride are not wanting in Caesar's history also.
We may regret that this exuberant nature was not permitted to work off
its follies and to preserve itself for the following generation
so miserably poor in talents, and so rapidly falling a prey
to the dreadful rule of mediocrities.

Pompeius' Plan of Campaign for 705

How far these events of the war in 705 interfered with Pompeius'
general plan for the campaign, and particularly what part, in that plan
was assigned after the loss of Italy to the important military corps
in the west, can only be determined by conjecture. That Pompeius
had the intention of coming by way of Africa and Mauretania
to the aid of his army fighting in Spain, was simply a romantic,
and beyond doubt altogether groundless, rumour circulating
in the camp of Ilerda. It is much more likely that he still kept
by his earlier plan of attacking Caesar from both sides in Transalpine
and Cisalpine Gaul(21) even after the loss of Italy, and meditated
a combined attack at once from Spain and Macedonia. It may be