s strong, laid down
their arms and were conveyed in the vessels of Libo to Macedonia
to be there incorporated with the Pompeian army, while Octavius was left
to complete the subjugation of the Illyrian coast now denuded of troops.
The Dalmatae, now far the most powerful tribe in these regions,(22)
the important insular town of Issa (Lissa), and other townships,
embraced the party of Pompeius; but the adherents of Caesar
maintained themselves in Salonae (Spalato) and Lissus (Alessio),
and in the former town not merely sustained with courage a siege,
but when they were reduced to extremities, made a sally with such effect
that Octavius raised the siege and sailed off to Dyrrhachium
to pass the winter there.

Result of the Campaign as a Whole

The success achieved in Illyricum by the Pompeian fleet,
although of itself not inconsiderable, had yet but little influence
on the issue of the campaign as a whole; and it appears miserably small,
when we consider that the performances of the land and naval' forces
under the supreme command of Pompeius during the whole eventful year 705
were confined to this single feat of arms, and that from the east,
where the general, the senate, the second great army, the principal fleet,
the immense military and still more extensive financial resources
of the antagonists of Caesar were united, no intervention at all
took place where it was needed in that all-decisive struggle in the west.
The scattered condition of the forces in the eastern half of the empire,
the method of the general never to operate except with superior masses,
his cumbrous and tedious movements, and the discord of the coalition
may perhaps explain in some measure, though not excuse, the inactivity
of the land-force; but that the fleet, which commanded the Mediterranean
without a rival, should have thus done nothing to influence
the course of affairs--nothing for Spain, next to nothing
for the faithful Massiliots, nothing to defend Sardinia, Sicily,
Africa, or, if not to reoccupy Italy, at least to obstruct its supplies--
this makes demands on our ideas of the confusion and perversity
prevailing in the Pompeian camp, which we can only with difficulty meet.

The aggregate result of this campaign was corresponding.
Caesar's double aggressive movement, against Spain and against Sicily
and Africa, was successful, in the former case completely,
in the latter at least partially; while Pompeius' plan
of starving Italy was thwar