with the sword of Germany, and the other contention that
neither Russia nor any European State had any right to interfere on
behalf of Servia is obvious. It was the greatest blunder of Germany's
many blunders in this Tragedy of Errors.
No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this
Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable
in its demands. It would be difficult to recall a more offensive
document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time
which it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to
answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually
admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. The
other European nations had little more than a day to consider what
could be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was
fatally compromised.[10]
[Footnote 10: English _White Paper_, No. 5; Russian _Orange Paper_,
No. 3.]
Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance
knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the
fact that on the day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the
German Empire instructed its Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian governments that
the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian
Government cannot but be looked upon as justified.[11]
[Footnote 11: German _White Paper_, Annex 1 B.]
How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the
substance of the ultimatum? Is it probable that Germany would have
given in a matter of the gravest importance a blanket endorsement of
Austria's demands, unless the German Government had first been fully
advised as to their nature?
The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it
does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily
prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M.
Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of
Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence
clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office
would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to
the other Powers on July the 23d unless it had full knowledge not
only of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also of the
substance thereof.
While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy
o
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