r to 1913 neither his wishes nor plans carried him further than
the congenial art of imperial posing. Behind his natural preference
for peace was ever the lurking fear that a disastrous war might cost
him his throne. The experience of Napoleon the Third was quite too
recent to be ignored.

In the Moroccan controversy, the unwillingness of France to assent to
all demands and the resolute purpose of England to support its ally,
presented a crisis, which could not be met with rhetorical phrases,
and the Kaiser found himself confronted with a situation, in which a
very considerable number of thoughtful and influential Germans
favored an immediate appeal to arms, and as to which only his word
was wanted to precipitate hostilities in 1911.

The Kaiser at that time failed to meet the expectations of those who
had expected a more warlike attitude from the knight "clad in shining
armor," and the expression "William the Peaceful" was bandied about
with increasing contempt by the war party in Germany, whose passions
the Crown Prince--not unwilling to push his royal father prematurely
from the pedestal of popularity--was assiduously fanning.

While the fact cannot yet be regarded as established, the writer
believes that the future may indubitably show that the Kaiser did have
full knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum in advance of its issuance
and gave his consent to the policy of that _coup_ in the hope that it
would somewhat restore his diminished prestige. He probably followed
this policy in the confident expectation that Russia would yield, as
it had yielded in 1908 in the Bosnian incident, and when he discovered
in Norway that Russia, while willing to maintain peace upon any
reasonable terms, was not disposed to surrender all its legitimate
interests in the Servian question, he, as will be more fully narrated
in the next chapter, hurried back to Berlin and for a time attempted
to reverse the policy and bring about a peaceful adjustment.

Unfortunately this attempt came too late. His military camarilla had
determined upon war. Preparations were then being feverishly made, and
the German and Austrian chancelleries were steadily and deliberately
shutting the door upon any possibility of peace.

To withdraw under these circumstances from an untenable position meant
a substantial impairment of his already diminished prestige. A
Washington would have saved the situation, but the Kaiser was not a
Washington.

Another most illum