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throws a searchlight upon the contention of Germany that its intentions were pacific and that it had been surprised by a sudden and treacherous attack on the part of Russia, France, and England. The difficulty, however, is to reconcile this apparent intention of the Kaiser's military staff to invade France on August the 1st and the action of his Foreign Office in failing to make any declaration of war against France and in retaining its Ambassador at Paris and permitting the French Ambassador to remain at Berlin. The diplomatic records abundantly show that this latter policy of the German Foreign Office was followed in the hope that France would become the aggressor, but its inconsistency with the policy of the War Office implied in the Kaiser's telegram is obvious. Possibly the Kaiser's soldiers and diplomats were not working in complete harmony. It may be true that the many blunders of German diplomats were in part due to the reckless impetuosity of the War Office and it is possible that some of von Bethmann-Hollweg's and von Jagow's diplomatic blunders are more properly attributable to the Kaiser and Moltke. It is also possible that the natural inference from the Kaiser's language above quoted is misleading and that the telegram to King George did not mean to imply that any orders for an invasion had been cancelled but simply that the army leaders on the Western frontier had been cautioned not to cross the frontier until further orders. Another possible theory is that the Kaiser for political reasons may have exaggerated the extent of his concession, and magnified the urgency of the situation to induce prompt and favorable action by Great Britain. But the readiness of Germany to strike a quick and fatal blow at Paris cannot be gainsaid and strangely contrasts with the "injured innocence" protestations that it was treacherously surprised by an unexpected attack. Always with Prussia, "the readiness is all." IV THE USE OF THE WORD "ENGLAND" In making these scattered _addenda_, I take this occasion to make the _amende honorable_ to some of my readers, who since the first editions of this book appeared have taken exception to my use of the word "England" and "English," where obviously "Great Britain" and "British" were meant. These critics are technically correct, but I hope that they will acquit me of any intention of ignoring any part of the British Empire in using a term, which by common and immem
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