England or Belgium but were simply
an informal exchange of view between the officials, and what is far
more to the purpose, the whole of the first conversation of April 10,
1906, was expressly based upon the statement that "_the entry of the
English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our
neutrality by Germany_."

The second document also shows that the Belgian Chief of Staff
expressly stated that any invasion of Belgium by England, made to
repel a prior German invasion, could not take place without the
express consent of Belgium, to be given when the occasion arose, and
it is further evident that the statement of the English military
attache--clearly a subordinate official to define the foreign policy
of a great Empire--expressly predicated his assumption, that England
might disembark troops in Belgium, upon the statement that its object
would be to repel a German invasion of Belgian territory.

If it be asked why England and Belgium were thus in 1906 and 1912
considering the contingency of a German invasion of Belgium and the
method of effectually repelling it, the reply is obvious that such
invasion, in the event of a war between Germany and France, was a
commonplace of German military strategists. Of this purpose they made
little, if any, concealment. The construction by Germany of numerous
strategic railway lines on the Belgian frontier, which were out of
proportion to the economic necessity of the territory, gave to Europe
some indication of Germany's purpose and there could have been little
doubt as to such intention, if Germany had not, through its Foreign
Office, given, as previously shown, repeated and continuous assurances
to Belgium that such was not its intention.

The German Chancellor--whose stupendous blunders of speech and action
in this crisis will be the marvel of posterity--has further attempted
to correct his record by two equally disingenuous defenses. Speaking
to the Reichstag on December 2, 1914, he said:

When on the 4th of August I referred to the wrong which we
were doing in marching through Belgium, it was not yet known
for certain whether the Brussels Government in the hour of
need would not decide after all to spare the country and to
retire to Antwerp under protest. You remember that, after
the occupation of Liege, at the request of our army leaders
I repeated the offer to the Belgian Government. For military
reasons it wa