ade. He writes:

The Bavarian Press appears to believe that a peaceful
solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible
but even probable. Official circles, on the contrary, for
some time past, have displayed with more or less sincerity
positive pessimism.

_The Prime Minister notably said to me to-day that the
Austrian note, of which he had cognizance, was in his
opinion drawn up in terms acceptable to Servia, but that the
present situation appeared to him none the less to be very
grave._[42]

[Footnote 42: French _Yellow Book_, No. 21.]

As it is unlikely that the Austrian Government would have dealt
directly with the Bavarian Government without similar communications
to the German Foreign Office, it follows as a strong probability that
the German Foreign Office and probably each of the constituent States
of Germany knew on July the 23d that Austria intended to demand that
which Servia had previously indicated its unalterable determination
to refuse. Under these circumstances the repeated and insistent
assurances that the German Foreign Office gave to England, France,
and Russia that it "_had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note
before it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its
contents_"[43] presents a policy of deception unworthy of a great
nation or of the twentieth century.

[Footnote 43: _Ante_, p. 36.]

It regarded this policy of submarine diplomacy as necessary, not only
to throw the other nations off their guard while Germany was arming,
but also to support its contention that the quarrel between Servia
and Austria was a local quarrel. If it appeared that Germany had
instigated Austria in its course, it could not have supported its
first contention that the quarrel was a local one and it could not
reasonably dispute the right of Russia to intervene. For this purpose
the fable was invented. It deceived no one.

The French _Yellow Book_ discloses another even more amazing feature
of this policy of deception, for it shows on the authority of the
Italian Foreign Minister that Germany and Austria did not even take
their own ally into their confidence. The significance of this fact
cannot be overestimated. Nothing in the whole record more clearly
demonstrates the purpose of the German and Austrian diplomats to set
a trap for the rest of Europe.

Under the terms of the Triple Alliance it was the duty of each member
to