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excitement, thus attempted to compromise France. The documents go far to suggest this possibility but are not wholly convincing. The German Ambassador on July the 24th, the very day that the ultimatum reached the chancelleries of Europe, and on the day when von Jagow untruthfully claimed that it had first reached Berlin, called upon the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and read to him a formal note, _of which he was unwilling to leave a copy_, although he characterized it as a note of importance. It may be here noted that on more than one occasion in this diplomatic crisis the German representatives were unwilling to leave a copy of the diplomatic messages which they orally communicated. In his memorandum the French Minister for Foreign Affairs says: The German Ambassador especially directed my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before he read it. He indicated that in them lay the chief point. I took note of the actual text, which is as follows: "The German Government considers that the present question is a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Powers have the greatest interest in restricting it to the two interested parties. The German Government ardently desires the localization of the conflict, since by the natural play of alliances any intervention by another Power would have incalculable consequences." I remarked to the German Ambassador that just as it appeared to be legitimate to call for the punishment of all those concerned in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution. I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen[52] that his note only took into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration; that of Servia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the accomplices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they
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