were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

[Footnote 52: The German Ambassador.]

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired
by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it
could be examined; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill
it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take
part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third
party Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally
cease to take interest in Servia, to take an attitude which
was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localize the
dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these
considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always
possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian
note the character of a simple _mise en demeure_, which
permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that
personally he had no views.[53]

[Footnote 53: French _Yellow Book_, No. 28.]

On the following day the German Ambassador again called at the French
Foreign Office and protested against an article, which had appeared in
a Paris newspaper and which had characterized his communication of the
preceding day as the "German menace." The German Ambassador again gave
an unequivocal assurance

that there was no agreement between Austria and Germany over
the Austrian note, _of which the German Government was
ignorant_, although the German Government had subsequently
approved it on receiving communication of it _at the same
time as the other Powers_.[54]

[Footnote 54: _Ibid._, No. 36.]

The hardihood of this statement, in view of the fact that on the
preceding day, simultaneously with the service of the ultimatum, the
threatening demand had been delivered by Germany to the leading
European chancelleries that the quarrel between Austria and Servia
must be localized, is apparent. Baron von Schoen, the German
Ambassador, then denied that his suggestion of "incalculable
consequences," if the dispute were not localized, was a "menace." This
statement, repeated by German diplomats in other capitals, approaches
the ludicrous. The first military power of Europe formally advises
other nations that unless they waive their legitimate claims and
interests, "incalculable consequences" will follow, and it is gravely
suggested that this is not a "menace."

On the