cooperation, if they could carry out their policy of so flouting
Russia as to compel it to initiate an aggressive war, as they clearly
hoped to do.

There was, however, another and very practical reason for this failure
to consult their ally. We have seen that the whole policy of the
Austrian ultimatum was founded upon secrecy. The plan was to give to
Europe no possible intimation of the intended action until it was
accomplished and then to give to Europe only twenty-four hours within
which to deliberate or act. If as a matter of courtesy Austria and
Germany submitted to their ally their proposed course of action,
Italy, being wholly opposed to any such unprovoked attack upon Servia,
might find a way, either by open and public protest or by dropping a
confidential intimation, to advise the other countries as to what was
in preparation. This would defeat the principal purpose of Germany and
Austria, to force a quick decision and to prepare for eventualities
before any other country could make ready. Germany and Austria
therefore wholly ignored their ally and pursued their stealthy policy
to its discreditable end.

When their diplomatic communications are disclosed in full, this
feature of their policy may disclose some significant admissions.

We have already seen (_ante_, p. 35) that when on July the 20th, three
days before the Austrian ultimatum was issued, Sir Edward Grey asked
Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, as to what news
he had from Vienna with reference to the intentions of his country,
Prince Lichnowsky affected to be ignorant. But it appears from a
letter, which M. Paul Cambon[45] wrote to his Foreign Office on July
the 24th, 1914, that Prince Lichnowsky had returned to London from
Berlin about a month before and had "displayed pessimistic views as to
the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin." Cambon adds that the
English Foreign Office and his other diplomatic colleagues had all
been struck "by the anxious appearance of Prince Lichnowsky since his
return from Berlin."[46]

[Footnote 45: The French Ambassador at London.]

[Footnote 46: French _Yellow Book_, No. 32.]

So designedly was the Austrian ultimatum withheld from the
chancelleries of Europe, other than Vienna and Berlin, that on the day
following its issuance at Belgrade, the only information which M.
Jules Cambon had of its issuance were the extracts in the press, and
he thereupon saw the German Secretary of State and