never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M.
Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general
European question was involved, the Servian question being
but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not
afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from
what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great
Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to
the effect that active intervention by her in the internal
affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing
Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military
measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was
it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to
declare war on Austria?

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian
mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but
a council of ministers was being held this afternoon to
consider the whole question. A further council would be
held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would
preside, when a decision would be come to....

Had England then followed the sagacious suggestion of Sazonof, would
war have been averted?

Possibly, perhaps probably. Germany's principal fear was the
intervention of England. In view of its supremacy on the seas this was
natural. It was England's intimation in the Moroccan crisis of 1911,
made in Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, which at that time
induced Germany to reverse the engines. Might not the same intimation
in 1914 have had a like effect upon the mad counsels of Potsdam? The
answer can only be a matter of conjecture. It depends largely upon how
deep-seated the purpose of Germany may have been to provoke a European
war at a time when Russia, France, or England were not fully prepared.

It does not follow that if Sazonof was right, Sir Edward Grey was
necessarily wrong in declining to align England definitely with Russia
and France at that stage. He was the servant of a democratic nation
and could not ignore the public opinion of his country as freely as
the Russian Foreign Minister. To take such a course, it would have
been necessary for Grey to submit the matter to Parliament, and while
with a large liberal majority his policy might have been endorsed, yet
it would have been after such an acrimonious discussion and su