the War was published.
Where, however, the Official History amends or supplements
figures, documents, etc., given in earlier official
publications, the fact is mentioned in a foot-note.]

[Sidenote: Delay of operations.]

Any just appreciation of the events of the first year of the war must
be based upon a clear understanding of the degree in which the
military action of the Salisbury Cabinet fell short of the advice
given by Lord Milner, and, in an equal degree by Lord Wolseley, the
Commander-in-Chief. We have noticed already[184] the grave inadequacy
of the measures of preparation for war carried out in South Africa
between the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference and the recall of
General Butler. On June 1st the South African garrison consisted of
4,462 men in Cape Colony, and 5,827 men in Natal; or 10,289 men with
24 field-guns in all.[185] On August 2nd the Government decided to
send 2,000 additional troops to Natal, and the Indian Government was
warned, a little later, that certain troops might be required for
service in South Africa. In spite of Lord Milner's urgent
representations of the danger of leaving the colonies unprotected, no
considerable body of troops, as we have seen, was ordered out, until
the diplomatic situation had become seriously aggravated by the
definite failure of the negotiations initiated by Sir William Greene
through Mr. Smuts.

[Footnote 184: See p. 191.]

[Footnote 185: Cd. 1,789 (War Commission). The Official
_History of the War in South Africa_ gives the total on
August 2nd as "not exceeding 9,940 men."]

Of the 10,000 men despatched after the Cabinet meeting of September
8th, more than half were requisitioned from the Indian Army, while the
remainder were drawn mainly from the Mediterranean garrisons.

Thus, by the beginning of the second week in October there were 22,104
British troops in South Africa, of whom 7,400 were at the Cape and
14,704 in Natal, and 60 field-guns.[186] But the Army Corps, the
"striking force," was still in England. In pursuance of its
determination to postpone to the last moment any action that could be
represented as an attempt to force a war upon the Boers, the British
Government had refrained from giving orders for the mobilisation of
the offensive force until October 7th, or a fortnight after the
Cabinet meeting of September 22nd, when its determination to
"formulate its own proposa