nduct of the military operations
which he directed were such as arose from the difficulty experienced
in supplying him upon all occasions with troops of the precise number
and character required.
[Sidenote: The German general staff.]
The second criticism is one put forward by the German General Staff,
forming, as it does, the only valid complaint against the professional
merits of Lord Roberts advanced by that body. The British
Commander-in-Chief, say these German critics, made it his object to
"manoeuvre" the Boers out of positions instead of inflicting severe
losses upon them. The answer to this criticism, in its general form,
is to be found in the physical conditions of the country. On the
occasions to which reference is made the burgher forces were found to
be posted on high ground, behind rocks or in intrenchments, with fine
open ground in front of them. Obviously in these circumstances what
military science required of the commander directing the attacking
force was to find a means of placing his own troops on equal terms
with the enemy; and this was what Lord Roberts did. The criticism,
however, as more precisely stated and applied to the battle of Diamond
Hill in particular, and to the engagements fought in the course of
Lord Roberts's advance from Bloemfontein to Pretoria, takes the form
of the allegation that, while the enveloping movement on both flanks
was executed successfully, the full result of this initial success was
not obtained because the attack upon the Boer centre was not pressed
home. In other words, the enemy's centre was never caught and
destroyed by the envelopment of his flanks. This is historically true,
and yet the German critics cannot be said to have established their
case, for they omit to take the tactics of the Boers into
consideration. Stated briefly, these were to hold on to a position and
inflict such losses as they could upon the attacking troops, until the
final assault became imminent; and then to mount their ponies and
gallop away. Against such tactics as these, it would have been of no
avail to push in a frontal attack with the certainty of incurring
heavy loss, and without the chance of securing a decisive success. It
would have been merely playing into the hands of the Boers.
Under such conditions all that was possible was to demonstrate against
the Boer centre in the hope of holding them in their position, until
the flanking columns should have nullified their mobility
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