of
this decision. Both in this case, and again in deciding to advance
from Bloemfontein upon Johannesburg and Pretoria, it was just by
taking his risks--risks that would have reduced a lesser man to
inaction--that Lord Roberts displayed the distinguishing quality of a
great captain of war. In both cases the best defence was to attack.
But as Lord Roberts, in this brief reference, does not indicate the
real point of the High Commissioner's representations, it is necessary
to state with some precision what it was that Lord Milner had actually
in his mind. The last thing which occurred to him was to advocate any
course that could weaken our offensive action. But the peculiarity of
the South African political situation, which enabled even a defeated
enemy, by detaching a very small force, to raise a new war in our
rear, in what was nominally our country, and thus to hamper, and
possibly altogether arrest, the forward movement, was constantly
present to his thought. The proposal which Lord Milner desired Lord
Roberts to adopt was that a certain minimum of mobile troops should be
definitely set aside for the defence of the Colony, and kept there,
whatever happened; since, in Lord Milner's opinion, it was only in
this way that a real and effective form of defence could be made
possible, and the number of men locked up in the passive defence of
the railway lines greatly reduced. If this suggestion had been carried
out, as Lord Milner intended, there would have been no second
rebellion. What prevented Lord Roberts from adopting the High
Commissioner's suggestion was the numerical insufficiency of the
troops at his disposal. In order to carry the war into the enemy's
country, he had practically to denude the Cape Colony of troops. The
subsequent course of the war will reveal the direct and disastrous
influence which the situation in the Cape Colony was destined to
exercise upon the military decisions of the republican leaders--an
influence which would have been lessened materially, if not altogether
removed, by the creation of this permanent and mobile force. And, in
point of fact, Lord Milner's apprehension that the rebellion might
even now interfere with the success of the forward movement, unless
adequate provision was made to keep it in check, received almost
immediate confirmation. While Lord Roberts was engaged in the capture
of Cronje's force at Paardeberg, the north-midland districts of
Prieska, Britstown, and Carnarvon,