doubt as to the present necessity of strengthening our
military position." But ten days later the despatch of this
reinforcement of 10,000 men was "not considered urgent." Since,
according to Lord Wolseley's minute of the proceedings of the meeting
held at the War Office on July 18th, 1899, General Buller used the
weight of his authority to support General Butler's opposition to Lord
Milner's urgent request for immediate reinforcements. In reply to a
question as to the desirability of strengthening the South African
garrisons, he said on this occasion, that--

"he had complete confidence in Butler's ability and forethought,
and that as long as clever men like Butler and Symons on the spot
did not say there was danger, he saw no necessity for sending out
any troops in advance of the Army Corps to strengthen our
position against any possible attack by the Boers on our
frontiers."

This memorandum, Lord Wolseley added, contained not the "exact words,"
but the "exact meaning" of what he said.[188] It was the precise
opposite of the view which Lord Milner had laid before the Home
Government.[189] Indeed the degree in which General Buller had
misconceived the entire military situation in South Africa became at
once apparent when he reached Capetown. He had come out to South
Africa with the not unnatural idea that he was to command a definite
British army, which was to engage a definite Boer army. When he had
learnt from Lord Milner and others what the situation actually was, he
is said to have gathered up his new impressions in the remark: "It
seems to me that I have got to conquer the whole of South Africa."
General Buller even appears to have shared the common belief of his
fellow-countrymen at home that the Cape was a British colony not only
in name but in fact. Nor was he prepared to abandon this belief all at
once. He suggested to the High Commissioner that it would be possible
to form local defence forces out of the Dutch farmers in the Colony.
Lord Milner said that this was totally impracticable; but he added
that he would consult Mr. Schreiner on the matter. It is needless to
say, however, that the Prime Minister deprecated the proposal in the
most emphatic terms.[190]

[Footnote 188: Cd. 1,789, pp. 15-17.]

[Footnote 189: Nor was the Intelligence Department less
urgent than Lord Milner. "In July of last year [1899],
earlier warnings being disregar