ded, a formal communication
was made for the consideration of the Cabinet, advising the
despatch of a large force fully equipped, estimated to be
sufficient to safeguard Natal and Cape Colony from the first
onrush of the Boers."--Sir John Ardagh, in _The Balfourian
Parliament_, 1900-1905. By Henry W. Lucy, p. 10. See also the
evidence of the War Commission, and the "Military Notes"
issued by the D. M. I. in June (1899).]

[Footnote 190: In a memorandum of November 20th (furnished to
Gen. Forestier-Walker) Gen. Buller, on the eve of starting
for Natal, gives as a first paragraph in his "appreciation of
the situation" the following remark: "1. Ever since I have
been here we have been like the man, who, with a long day's
work before him, overslept himself and so was late for
everything all day." (_Official History_, p. 209.)]

The War Office scheme was designed to provide a defensive force to
hold the colonies, and an offensive force to invade the Republics. In
the three months that elapsed before this scheme was put into effect,
the conditions upon which it was based had changed completely. On the
day that Buller reached Capetown (October 31st) White, with almost the
whole of the Natal defensive force, was shut up in Ladysmith by
Joubert. When at length the last units of the Army Corps were landed
(December 4th) in South Africa, Buller was at Maritzburg, organising a
force for the relief of White; and practically the entire offensive
force had been broken up to disengage the defensive forces, or save
them from destruction. Buller himself had 14,000 of the Army Corps in
Natal, and more were to follow; Methuen was taking 8,000 men for the
relief of Kimberley; and the balance were being pushed up to
strengthen the original defensive forces that were holding the
railways immediately South of the Orange Free State border, and
checking the rebellion in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony.
Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg (December 10th), Methuen's defeat at
Magersfontein (December 11th), and Buller's defeat at Colenso
(December 15th) together provided ample evidence of the fact that,
however desirable it might be to assume the offensive, a purely
defensive _role_ must for the time be assigned to the troops then in
South Africa; and that this state of affairs must continue until the
arrival of very co