o injure the
interests of their country if the Government had mobilised the army
corps, and despatched the ten thousand defensive troops in June, than
they did when these measures were postponed until September. But,
however this may be, the circumstance that this proposal was made by
Mr. Chamberlain, and refused by Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman, is
noteworthy both as an indication of the spirit of lofty patriotism of
which the Salisbury Cabinet, in spite of its initial error, was
destined to give more than one proof in the course of the war and as
an example of a method of escaping from the injurious results of a
well-recognised defect in the democratic system of government--a
method which, it is not unreasonable to hope, may be employed with
success should the like occasion arise at any future time.

This, then, was the state of affairs in England. The Opposition
throughout the negotiations was proclaiming that war was out of the
question, and that preparations for war were altogether unnecessary.
The people, being ignorant of the progress which the nationalist
movement in South Africa had made, were irresolute, and withheld from
the Government the support without which it could not make adequate
military preparations, except at the risk of defeat in Parliament and
possible loss of office.

[Sidenote: Objects of Afrikander policy.]

What was the position in South Africa? Above all, what was the
position of the man whose duty it was "to take all such measures and
do all such things" as were necessary for the safety of the subjects
of the Crown and for the maintenance of British interests? The
ignorance of South Africa that led to the partial paralysis of the
Government was in no sense attributable to him. The broad fact that
the Afrikander nationalist[156] movement had made the moral supremacy
of the Dutch complete was declared by Lord Milner, during his visit to
England in the winter of 1898-9, to the Colonial Secretary and other
members of the Salisbury Cabinet. His verdict that nothing but prompt
and energetic action on the part of the Imperial Government could keep
South Africa a part of the Empire was publicly made known (so far as
he was concerned) in his despatch of May 4th, 1899, which was
withheld, however, from publication until June 14th. The Bloemfontein
Conference was a device of the Afrikander nationalists at the Cape to
avert a military conflict between the South African Republic and Great
Britain, which